Kastellorizo for Cyprus: An amicable exchange?
There may be a possibility of Turkey downgrading its role as a guarantor in Cyprus if Greece can relinquish its maritime drilling rights off Kastellorizo.
We are living in times of great tensions between Turkey and Greece over offshore energy exploration rights in the Eastern Mediterranean. Tensions are the highest they’ve been since 1996, when a dispute erupted between Turkey and Greece over the Kardak (Imia) islets in the Aegean. The incidents in the Aegean also happened to take place in the same year Greek Cypriot have-a-go-hero Solomon Solomou was shot dead by Turkish troops for trying to tear down a Turkish flag from a flagpole along the UN-controlled buffer zone that divides Cyprus.
Over the last two decades, the Turkish-Greek dispute over the islets has been de-escalated, although the issue still remains unresolved, just like many disputes that have lingered since the Greco-Turkish war ended in 1922. One such manifestation of these problems occurred in Cyprus in 1974, when a Greek military junta ousted then-Cypriot president Archbishop Makarios with the aim of annexing the island. This prompted a Turkish military operation that saw the island divided into a Turkish Cypriot north and a Greek Cypriot south. Some nine years later, in 1983, this division was cemented when the Turkish Cypriots announced the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) as an independent state. To date, Turkey, which still has its troops stationed in northern Cyprus, remains the only country to have diplomatic ties with the TRNC, while the rest of the international community recognises the Greek Cypriot-led Republic of Cyprus, based in the south, as the island’s sole legitimate authority.
RELATED:
East Med tensions: War the aim, gas the excuse
France and Turkey put EU and NATO at odds in Libya
Greece waves white flag at Turkey in the Mediterranean
The latest tensions are yet another manifestation of the lingering problems between Greeks and Turks. This time, the tensions are not over land, but over the sea. The discovery of natural gas under the Eastern Mediterranean seabed, particularly in international waters off Cyprus, has brought these two civilisations, one Christian and one Muslim, to loggerheads once again.
“Maritime Enosis”
The first issue of contention for Turkey is the unilateral behaviour of the Greek Cypriot government in signing over drilling rights to international energy firms. Turkey argues that there should be no wheelings and dealings over the hydrocarbon reserves off Cyprus until Turkish Cypriots have their rights to revenues from the gas guaranteed. This could either be in the form of a solution to the “Cyprus Problem” along the lines of a bizonal, bicommunal federal roadmap that was endorsed by the UN in 2014, or the establishment of a joint committee set up for the sharing of resources. The Greek Cypriot side has thus far refused to yield to such demands, although it has unilaterally promised to hold on to revenues designated for the Turkish Cypriots which it would release to them when an agreement is finally struck. For Turkish Cypriots, however, this gesture amounts to withholding urgently needed funds with the aim of forcing them to give maximum concessions in negotiations over territory, veto rights and security guarantees.
Another issue of contention is Greece’s claimed Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in the Mediterranean. As the sovereign possessor of most islands in the Aegean, Greece has been able to extend its claims all the way up to the Turkish mainland, denying Turkey any rights in the Aegean. Greece has also used its easternmost populated island of Kastellorizo, located just 2 kilometres off Turkey’s coastal province of Antalya, to connect its claimed EEZ with that of the Greek Cypriots. This Greek-Greek Cypriot maritime corridor, which one could argue is a form of “Enosis” (the unity of Cyprus with Greece), threatens to box Turkey into a small space in the Bay of Iskenderun, between Anatolia and the northern coast of Cyprus.
Considering Turkey’s relatively large size and massive population in comparison to that of Greece, accepting these claims is completely out of the question for Ankara. First of all, Turkey is not a signatory to the updated version of the international law of the sea, which indicates that countries can establish their EEZ claims around islands. Turkey insists that EEZs can only be established around mainland territories. Even then, states have a responsibility to negotiate maritime demarcations with neighbouring countries in potentially contested areas. Greece did not consult Turkey when establishing its maximalist claim, which Turkey looks upon as an absurd attempt to cut it out of an area where Greek and Turkish territories share close proximity to one another.
“Blue Homeland”
As the second largest army in NATO, Turkey is not afraid to deploy its naval forces when it feels its sovereign rights are being usurped, as it has demonstrated countless times in the Aegean when countering Greek unilateral steps. In late 2019, Turkey also signed a memorandum of understanding with the UN-recognised government in Libya to delineate their respective EEZs. The agreement, which was secured within the scope of Turkey’s so-called “Blue Homeland” doctrine, saw an imaginary line drawn southeast of the Greek island of Crete, thus dividing Greece’s claimed EEZ between Turkey and Libya. Through this deal, Turkey gained the endorsement of another country of its claims to the Eastern Mediterranean.
Greece immediately rejected the Turkish-Libyan deal as illegitimate, and went in search of friends to endorse its own claims. France heeded the call from Athens, and sent a French warship to the region, seemingly to dissuade Turkey from actually implementing its deal with Libya. However, the French move did not gain widespread support in Europe, especially because it was seen to escalate tensions between NATO allies in a region plagued by creeping Russian influence.
Believing it still had the diplomatic upper-hand, Turkey continued to deploy its drillships off Crete, in defiance of French and Greek threats. Ankara also continued to indirectly offer incentives to Egypt with the aim of preventing Cairo from signing a maritime demarcation deal with Athens, which would in effect nullify Ankara’s deal with Tripoli. Alas, Egypt did wind up signing such a deal with Greece, but not without Greece giving Egypt some major concessions.
Egypt went into the demarcation talks with Greece with some leverage. An alternative demarcation deal with Turkey would have given Egypt more maritime territory in the waters off Cyprus. So when agreeing on its mutual sea boundary with Egypt, Greece actually retreated several kilometres from its original claim to give Egypt more territory. Yet, Egypt and Greece only delineated one part of their claimed EEZs. The boundary south of Kastellorizo was not included in the agreement, thus leaving Egypt with the option to one day take Turkey up on its offer as well. Turkey saw the absence of an agreement on this boundary between Egypt and Greece as a confirmation of Turkish claims to its piece of the Mediterranean pie. Meanwhile, critics in Greece accused the Greek government of surrendering Kastellorizo to appease Turkey.
To a certain extent, this might be true, but not in a literal sense. Greece has not sacrificed its sovereignty over Kastellorizo, but by excluding it from the deal with Egypt, Athens has indicated to Ankara that it is willing to negotiate. This may have actually been more of an Egyptian initiative than a Greek one, as Egypt has no need to provoke Turkey in the region as Turkey does not lay claim to any Egyptian maritime territory. To the contrary, despite the absence of protests from Cairo, Turkey has in the past insisted that Greek and Greek Cypriot EEZ claims are in fact impeding on Egyptian rights. However, one cannot rule out Greece’s desire to leave the door open for a de-escalation with Turkey.
Greece’s Kastellorizo card
For the time-being, Greece prefers not to play the Kastellorizo card. Instead, it prefers to hold on to it while reserving the right to play it whenever it pleases. Perhaps Athens is looking to make gains in other areas of negotiation with Ankara, knowing full well that Turkey is desperate for a greater share of the Eastern Mediterranean, not only because of the gas reserves in the region, but also to block the “Maritime Enosis” between Greece and Cyprus, and in doing so guarantee itself a corridor to the open seas.
The question is, what else could Greece possibly want? It has already made a maximalist claim for maritime territory. The only thing missing is Turkey’s official recognition of these claims, which, quite frankly, it is never going to get. The only way to get Greece to backtrack from its EEZ claims, therefore, is to offer other incentives.
Yes, Turkey may be more powerful militarily, but Greece has shown to have the political strength that Turkey lacks. Not only has Greece invited its friend France to enter the fray on its behalf, thus matching Turkey’s military prowess, but it is beginning to show the ability to mobilise the European Union in slapping Turkey with economic sanctions as well. With the Turkish lira currency already appearing to be in a free-fall against the US dollar, as well as rising inflation and depleted foreign currency reserves in its central bank, Turkey can barely afford to be hit with sanctions. At some point, Turkey is going to have to sit down and listen to Greece’s conditions for retreating from its original EEZ claims. No doubt, those conditions, whatever they are, can only be in respect to the same geopolitical ambitions Greece has always had since its declaration of independence in 1821. I am of course referring to the so-called “Megali Idea” (Big Plan) for a Greater Greece.
The “Megali Idea” envisions a nation built upon the Ancient Greek empire of Alexander the Great. It includes all of the Greek mainland, more or less the entire Anatolian coastline, Constantinople (Istanbul), and, surprise surprise, Cyprus. This Hellenic dream almost became reality until it was cut short by a Greek defeat in Smyrna (Izmir) during Turkish war of independence in 1922. It was once again on the agenda when the Greek junta overran Cyprus in 1974. We still see echoes of it today, particularly in the use of Kastellorizo to link the EEZs of Greece and Cyprus, hence my calling it a “Maritime Enosis”.
For Greece to retreat from its current position, therefore, it must be offered a concession which will further the cause of the “Megali Idea” in another area. This could come in many ways, shapes and forms, including greater rights for Greeks living in Turkey. It could also mean enhanced Greek economic ties in places like Izmir, where Greece might like to revive the presence of a Greek diaspora. On the other hand, it could seek Turkey’s help in advancing its soft power in the Balkans, where Turkey holds considerable influence. Or, in return for playing down the importance of Kastellorizo, Greece may request that Turkey scales down its involvement in Cyprus.
Return of the Acheson Plan
The reason for the failure of the 2017 Crans Montana peace talks between the Turkish and Greek Cypriots was a disagreement over the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee. The treaty grants Turkey, Greece and Britain the right to unilaterally or collectively intervene in Cyprus with the aim of restoring the island’s state of affairs if and whenever it is breached. Turkey based its argument for its intervention in 1974 on that treaty, even though the end result was not the restoration of the state of affairs.
The Greek Cypriot side absolutely refused to go ahead with peace talks until the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey agreed to trash the treaty. The Turkish Cypriots refused, and the talks collapsed. Three years on, there are murmurs of a resumption of talks after the Turkish Cypriot presidential elections in October, and even suggestions that the articles in the 1960 treaty could be revised, or replaced entirely by another treaty that would still guarantee Turkey some kind of say in the island’s affairs. It would not, therefore, be far-fetched to assume that the abrogation of this treaty could be the aim of Greece’s diplomatic weaponising of Kastellorizo, also known by the name Megisti, or in Turkish, Meis. If Turkey relinquishes its rights to Cyprus, perhaps Greece will relinquish its rights to Kastellorizo.
Of course, if such a trade-off is proposed, it wouldn’t be the first time. It was first brought up in 1964 by former US Secretary of State Dean Acheson. He suggested handing Kastellorizo over to Turkey in return for Cyprus becoming part of Greece. The Turkish Cypriots in Cyprus were to be given autonomous cantons in certain parts of the island, but would ultimately come under the sovereign power of Greece while enjoying the same rights offered to the Turks of Western Thrace in accordance with the Treaty of Lausanne. Turkey at the time accepted the Acheson plan as a basis for negotiations, but Greek Cypriot president Archbishop Makarios rejected the plan, as he considered the presence of the autonomous cantons to be an obstacle to full Enosis.
On September 9, 1967, then-prime minister of Turkey, Suleyman Demirel, travelled to Alexandroupolis (Dedeagac) to meet with the nationalist military leaders of Greece who had just months earlier staged a coup in Athens and taken control of the country. It is reported that during his visit, the Greek junta offered to transfer all Turkish Cypriots from Cyprus to Kastellorizo, and then hand the island of 9 square kilometres over to Turkey. Accepting this offer would have granted Turkey swathes of maritime territory in the Eastern Mediterranean that is now contested with Greece, but to turn its back on Cyprus would have left the Turkish ports of Mersin and Iskenderun vulnerable to naval blockade. Even if Cyprus was to remain independent, Turkey had no guarantees that Greece would not one day try to annex Cyprus. Enosis would have undoubtedly rendered Turkey’s acquisition of Kastellorizo null and void, and what’s more, without the presence of allied Turkish Cypriots in Cyprus, Ankara would have no native proxy force to put up any kind of resistance against the annexation of the island.
Exactly 53 years since the discussion between Demirel and his Greek counterpart Konstantinos Kollias took place, the same principles still apply for Turkey. Whatever happens, Turkey cannot afford to completely pull out of Cyprus, but there is a possibility of it partially loosening its grip on the island if Greece can do the same with Kastellorizo. In seeking a de-escalation, Turkey may tone down its demand for guarantor rights in Cyprus if Greece shows a willingness to fairly negotiate with Turkey on the matter of Kastellorizo and the Aegean. Turkey has a lot to offer Greece; some of those incentives are mentioned above. Turkey could also open the door to a united Cyprus joining NATO, while the Greek Cypriots could in return remove their veto on Turkey’s EU accession bid.
One way or another, someone will need to budge in this dispute, as any further escalation from this point can only lead to war, which would be detrimental to both Greece and Turkey, as well as the people of Cyprus. Defeat in war for Greece would mean losing Kastellorizo and the setting back of the Megali Idea ambition to dominate the Eastern Mediterraean by 100 years, while defeat for Turkey would mean the loss of Cyprus and the collapse of security along its entire southern coastline. Neither side is in a position to take such risks, and even if they were, it is not in the interest of Western hegemony to allow one side or another to grow all-powerful in the region, as the West prefers to maintain a frozen conflict stand-off between equally matched rivals that requires Western mediation efforts, thus securing the West’s relevance to this strategic part of the world.
So, if war is off the cards, there can only be negotiation, and there is certainly no lack of substance to get the conversation started.
Ertan Karpazli is the Editor-in-Chief of Radio EastMed.
Tweets @Ertan_Karpazli
All views expressed by the writer are solely his own.
Support Radio EastMed on Patreon!
Radio EastMed is a brand new news portal that had its soft launch in January 2020. It is still in its beta stage and aims to be ready for a hard launch by the end of 2021.
We are a completely independent platform run entirely by volunteers. We have no affiliation to any state bodies, political parties, business lobbies, religious congregations, civil society groups or trade unions. We also do not receive any income from investors, sponsors of advertisers.
But in order to continue providing an outstanding service, Radio EastMed needs you, the supporters of free and fair media! Your generous donations will enable us to create jobs, hire interns and run practical training courses for young, aspiring journalism students from disenfranchised communities.
So please support us by becoming a Patron today! CLICK HERE to visit our page on Patreon and find out how you can help us provide an even better service. All donations, big and small, are appreciated.